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I will see it done: 
Metonymic extensions 
of the verb see in English
Abstract. English verbs of perception appear to be significant generators of divergent polysemous sens-
es. The aim of this paper is to propose a dictionary study of the verb see. It appears that many seman-
tic extensions of the term are metonymic in nature, because they are motivated by metonymic shifts 
within specific State-of-Affairs Scenarios (SASs). Three distinct dictionary sources are consulted in order 
to identify different metonymic extensions of the verb see. The majority of the database samples appear 
to belong to the part for whole propositional metonymy category (a stage of SAS for SAS). The concep-
tual link between seeing and intellectual comprehension is complex and appears to require the discus-
sion of metonymy–metaphor interaction for its fuller explanation. The analysis is followed by conclu-
sions drawn from the database study, as well as suggestions for future research in the field of metonymic 
extensions of English terms of visual perception. 
Keywords: propositional metonymy, State-of-Affairs Scenarios, metonymy–metaphor interaction, visu-
al perception, see.
1. A brief outline of the propositional metonymy theory
The theory of metonymy in contemporary linguistics has come a long way from 
the days of rising interest in the topic (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Norrick 1981; Nunberg 
1978). This has occurred through a primary focus on the referential aspects of metony-
mies (Croft 1993; Kövecses & Radden 1998; Radden & Kövecses 1999) and also a more 
inclusive look at the issue, encompassing types of formal, propositional, and illocution-
ary metonymy (Bierwiaczonek 2001, 2007, 2013; Hernández 2007; Panther & Thornburg 
1999, 2003b, 2003c; Ruiz de Mendoza & Otal Campo 2002). In his discussion of meton-
ymy, Bierwiaczonek (2013: 16) adopts a modified definition of Kövecses and Radden 
(1998: 39) to refer to metonymy as “a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, 
the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, associated 
with it within the same single integrated conceptualisation.” This definition warrants 
a significantly broad understanding of the term, which encompasses, besides referen-
tial metonymy, different types of formal, propositional, and illocutionary metonymy. 
1 Address for correspondence: Institute of English, University of Silesia, ul. Gen. Stefana Grota- 
-Roweckiego 5,41-205 Sosnowiec, Poland. E-mail: lukasz.matusz@us.edu.pl
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The focus of the present paper is on propositional metonymy, as presented by Panther 
and Thornburg (1999, 2003a, 2005, 2007) and modified by Bierwiaczonek (2013). 
Bierwiaczonek (2013: 24-26) disregards Panther and Thornburg’s distinction between 
referential and predicational types within the propositional metonymy category. Instead, 
he proposes that propositional metonymy can be divided into propositional sentential 
metonymy and predicative metonymy. Thus, in Bierwiaczonek’s (2013: 156) definition: 
Propositional metonymy is a metonymy in which the whole propositional content p of 
a sentence S is used to access either the whole ICM, or another propositional content q 
within the same ICM. If the proposition serving as the target is accessed by a sentence whose 
propositional meaning is completely different from the target (i.e. its subject and predicate 
are different), then the metonymy may be called sentential. If the propositional metonymy 
is limited to the predicate, the metonymy is referred to as predicative. 
A significant example of propositional (predicative) metonymy in action was presented 
by Lakoff (1987: 78), who reported on the way in which the speakers of Ojibwa, a Native 
American language of central Canada, refer to the activity of travelling. Upon being 
asked how they arrived at a certain destination, Ojibwa speakers would typically reply 
with the following English equivalents: 
1. I started to come.
2. I stepped into a canoe.
3. I got into a car.
What follows is that Ojibwa speakers have a way of conventionally using a particular 
stage of the travelling script, namely the stage of Embarkation, to talk about the scenar-
io as a whole. The particular cognitive construct underlying this kind of metonymic 
transfer consists of five stages representing the prototypical succession of events 
for moving towards a destination in a vehicle:
Table 1. The Travelling Scenario (Lakoff 1987: 78)
1 Precondition You have (or have access to) the vehicle. 
2 Embarkation You get into the vehicle and start it up. 
3 Centre You drive (row, fly, etc.) to your destination.
4 Finish You park and get out.
5 End point You are at your destination.
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Ojibwa speakers using the stage of Embarkation to talk about travelling as a whole 
represents a predicative metonymy in which part of the travelling script is used to access 
the whole scenario (part for whole metonymy). Lakoff (1987: 78) notes also that this 
kind of metonymy is by no means limited to Ojibwa. Speakers of English, for instance, 
often use similar predicative metonymies in which different stages of the script refer 
to travelling as a whole:
4.  I have a car. (Precondition)
5.  I borrowed my brother’s car. (Precondition)
6.  I hopped on a bus. (Embarkation) 
7.  I just stuck out my thumb. (Embarkation)
8.  I drove. (Centre) 
Bierwiaczonek (2013: 158) notes in this context that the Travelling Scenario in English 
may also be accessed by more conceptually distant sentential metonymies, as in (9) and 
(10), below: 
9.  My brother gave me a lift. (Precondition)
10.  My sister had lent me her car. (Precondition)
The script presented in Table 1, above, is a particular realisation of what Panther 
and Thornburg (1999: 337) refer to as a State-of-Affairs Scenario (SAS), that is, a general 
script for propositional contents describing an existing (actual) state of affairs. A SAS is 
divided into four stages developing in time, each one possessing its specific elements, 
as demonstrated in Table 2:
Table 2. State-of-Affairs Scenario (Panther & Thornburg 1999: 337) 
1. The Before
Necessary preconditions: motivations, potentialities, capabilities, 
abilities, dispositions, etc., which can bring about the State of Affairs
2. The Core The existing, true State of Affairs
3. The Effects
Necessary consequences immediately following from the State 
of Affairs
4. The After Non-necessary consequences of the State of Affairs
In the forthcoming sections, I adopt Panther and Thornburg’s (1999) framework 
of SASs in order to propose specific scripts motivating different propositional metony-
mies of the verb see in English. 
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2. Methodology
The aim of this paper is to propose a dictionary analysis of the verb see in English 
in order to identify different metonymically motivated extensions of the term. For this 
aim, I intend to focus primarily on the framework of propositional metonymy, 
as defined by Bierwiaczonek (2013: 156). Different propositional metonymies of the verb 
are presented by means of Panther and Thornburg’s (1999: 337) SASs in their various 
realisations. The subsequent study is based on a database analysis involving three 
dictionary sources: Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary (CCALED), 
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (LDCE), and The New Oxford Dictionary 
of English (TNODE). Admittedly, focusing the analysis solely on dictionary sources 
may seem controversial because it conceivably poses the risk of providing less repre-
sentative results than real-life corpora-based data. However, the main goal of this anal-
ysis is to look at specific senses of the verb see in order to propose a framework on which 
future, possibly more representative research may be constructed. I believe that a short 
dictionary analysis may be sufficient for this purpose.
In order to analyse different senses of the verb see, appropriate dictionary entries 
have been considered and representative examples are provided with their dictionary 
sources in parentheses. The starting point of the analysis should conceivably be to iden-
tify the basic, non-metonymic sense of the verb. LDCE defines the primary meaning 
of see as to “notice/examine something using your eyes.” According to CCALED, “when 
you see something, you notice it using your eyes.” Consider the following examples from 
the dictionary database:  
11.  Can you see the Houses of Parliament from here? (LDCE)
12.  I saw a man making his way towards me. (CCALED)
13.  You can’t see colours at night. (CCALED)
The primary meaning of see appears to be, thus, the one of visual perception 
of the object of seeing. An adequate description of human visual modality and its 
linguistic representation goes well beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say here 
that in visual perception, an individual experiences immediate and direct sensory data, 
irrespective of the intentional act of the individual’s will (Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976: 
586). Thus, in the remaining part of this article, whenever I make a reference to the act 
of seeing, I refer to (unless otherwise specified) the act of an involuntary perception 
of visual data by a sentient human individual.  
In the forthcoming sections, I aim to distinguish different metonymic extensions 
of see by analysing dictionary entries for the term in order to establish which senses 
of the verb are underlain by possible propositional metonymic transfers. For this aim, 
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I refer to SASs as presented by Panther and Thornburg (1999). The act of seeing in differ-
ent SASs presented below appears to be a salient stage of its respective scenarios. 
Therefore, I expect to find cases in which the act of visual perception is a part of a larger 
SAS (part for whole metonymy). Selected SASs, serving as the basis for the examples, 
will be presented, as well. It is conceivable that for some database examples, the analy-
sis based on metonymic shifts within SASs will not be sufficient and that for a fuller 
understanding of the issues at hand, the role of metonymy–metaphor interaction should 
also be considered. 
In the forthcoming analysis, I am going to focus on a number of polysemy patterns 
of see as they are presented and exemplified in the dictionary sources. Therefore, this 
paper does not presume to provide the full picture of how metonymic processes operate 
in different senses of the verb. Also, the limited scope of this paper precludes any reason-
able representation of a full polysemy network for English expressions of visual percep-
tion. Despite these shortcomings, I hope that the forthcoming analysis provides 
a reasonably informative and sufficiently representative account of certain metonym-
ic patterns of the verb see on which future study of the issues at hand may be based.
3. Part for whole metonymic patterns of see
In his discussion of the metonymy-motivated polysemy of verbs, Bierwiaczonek (2013: 
201-202) provides numerous examples in which the act of seeing is a central component 
of a more complex script (part for whole metonymy): 
14.  We are going to see ‘Hamlet’ tonight. 
– seeing as part of watching for watching
15.  I’m seeing the doctor tomorrow afternoon. 
– seeing as part of visit for visiting
16.  Tom is seeing a client. 
– seeing as part of meeting for meeting
17.  They’ve been seeing a lot of each other. 
– seeing as part of spending time with someone for spending time with that person
18.  Mary is seeing John now. 
– part of having a romantic relationship for having a romantic relationship 
19.  It’s up to you to see if the job is done properly. 
– part of checking and controlling for checking and controlling
The categories proposed by Bierwiaczonek are corroborated by numerous examples 
from the dictionary database. Consider, for instance, the following: 
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20.  We’re going to see ‘Romeo and Juliet’ tonight. (LDCE)
21.  He had been to see the semi-final of the FA Cup. (CCALED)  
– seeing as part of watching for watching
22.  She was seen by a doctor but didn’t need hospital treatment. (LDCE)
23.  You need to see a doctor. (CCALED) 
– seeing as part of visit for visiting
24.  Mr. Thomas is seeing a client at 2:30. (LDCE)
25.  You may need to see a solicitor. (TNODE) 
 – seeing as part of meeting for meeting
26.  They have been seeing a lot of each other. (LDCE)
27.  They’ve seen more of each other since Dan moved to London. (LDCE) 
–  seeing as part of spending time with someone for spending time with that person
28.  Is she seeing anyone at the moment? (LDCE)
29.  My husband was still seeing her and was having an affair with her. (CCALED) 
 – part of having a romantic relationship for having a romantic relationship
30.  Please see that the lights are switched off. (LDCE)
31.  See that you take care of him. (CCALED) 
– part of checking and controlling for checking and controlling
In sentences (20) to (31), the act of seeing is metonymically used to access its respec-
tive scenario as a whole. Thus, I consider (20) to (31) to be examples of part for whole 
propositional metonymy. Each of the above categories requires a specific SAS in order 
to illustrate the metonymic transfer. Consider, by way of illustration, the following 
Watching Scenario underlying examples (14), (20), and (21):
Table 3. The Watching Scenario
The Watching Scenario
1. The Before
There is a certain show, play, or film Y available to watch for X.
X is a sentient individual capable of watching Y.
Y carries a certain message, some information, or a meaning 
that can be internalized or understood by X.
X wants to see Y.
(…)
2. The Core
X comes into visual contact with Y.
X visually perceives (sees) Y.
X engages in watching Y.
X terminates watching Y.
3. The Effects
X has internalized or understood the message, information, 
or meaning carried by Y.
X has the experience of watching Y.
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The Watching Scenario
4. The After
X shares his/her experience of Y with other individuals.
(…)
The SAS of watching a show, play, film, or similar spectator event requires the event 
(Y) being the object of visual perception for a sentient human individual (X). Y is assumed 
to carry a certain kind of message, information, or meaning that X is able and willing 
to decode and internalize or understand. Moreover, the individual must be willing 
to watch the event and undertake steps to do so. The “(…)” marking in the Before stage 
is meant to represent any further unspecified preparatory conditions necessary for the 
scenario to take place, such as the need of the spectator to possess the mental or physical 
capacity to engage in the act of watching, or the lack of impeding forces or circumstanc-
es preventing the individual from taking part in the activity. The Core of the scenar-
io requires X coming into visual contact with Y, followed by the visual perception 
of the spectator event. X must, subsequently, engage in the act of watching by volun-
tarily paying attention to Y over a period of time. Watching implies, thus, the act of voli-
tion on the part of the spectator. The Core of the scenario is concluded with eventual 
termination of the watching experience. Numerous elements of the Effects may include 
X’s having internalized or understood the information carried by Y, as well as having 
the experience of watching Y. Finally, the non-necessary consequences of the scenar-
io (the After stage) may include, among numerous unspecified others, the spectator 
sharing the experience with other individuals. 
I believe that the script presented in Table 3 is sufficiently representative 
of the Watching Scenario underlying the metonymic shift exemplified by (14), (20), 
and (21). In those cases, the Core stage of X visually perceiving (seeing) Y stands for the 
whole Watching Scenario (part for whole metonymy). 
Apart from the Watching Scenario, similar scripts may be proposed for other catego-
ries presented by Bierwiaczonek (2013: 201-202) in order to illustrate part for whole 
metonymic mappings within their respective SASs. In all of them, the act of visual 
perception metonymically stands for the whole respective script.
Consider, by way of illustration, sentences (15), (22), and (23), which refer to a particu-
lar Visiting Scenario encompassing a patient’s appointment at a doctor’s office in order 
to receive medical attention. Unavoidably, the act of visual perception of the doctor 
by the patient (and of the patient by the doctor) is a salient stage of the script allow-
ing for the part for whole metonymic shift. It is important to note at this point that 
a feasible description of different examples from the dictionary database may require 
their underlying scenarios to be appropriately adjusted and modified.
For instance, other kinds of visits may require distinct variations of the Visiting 
Scenario. Consider the following:
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32.  I will be seeing her tomorrow night. (LDCE)
33.  I saw Jane while I was out. (LDCE)
34.  I don’t know who he is, but I’ve seen him around. (LDCE)
Sentences (32) to (34) refer to visiting or meeting a person, presumably for personal 
rather than medical or business-related purposes. The act of visual perception remains 
a salient stage of the script, but other elements of the scenario would have to be 
adequately modified for a comprehensive representation of the metonymic transfer. 
Note also that it is possible to use the verb see to metonymically stand for visiting a place 
or location rather than a person, as shown below:
35.  I would like to see Alaska. (TNODE)
36.  I want to see something of those countries. (TNODE)
37.  Would you like to see round the house? (LDCE)
Sentences (35) and (36) refer to the scenario of travelling or visiting places in the sense 
of undertaking a recreational or touristic activity, but the context of sentence (37) 
is different and may involve either a meeting for personal purposes or a commercial 
activity in which visitors inspect a house they intend to rent or purchase. Thus, (35) 
and (36) would conceivably require a different variation of a SAS than (37) in order 
for their respective part for whole metonymic shifts to be illustrated. 
The analysis of the dictionary database suggests also that the Checking and Controlling 
Scenario, underlying examples (19), (30), and (31), may have a number of varieties. 
For instance, certain scripts of Checking and Controlling involve a strong willingness 
to help or assist a person, thus possessing the illocutionary force of promises or offers 
to perform a particular activity (commissives):
38.  Leave the papers with me and I’ll see what I can do. (LDCE)
39.  I must see about selling the house. (CCALED)
40.  I’ll see to Dad’s tea. (TNODE)
Other examples may be used to oblige the addressee to perform an activity, thus 
possessing the illocutionary value of directives:
41. You should get that tooth seen to by the dentist. (LDCE)
 
Another variation involves the speaker’s making sure that a person is adequately 
rewarded for an action or behaviour, as in (42), below:
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42. Just do this for me and I will see you right. (LDCE)
It seems safe to assume, therefore, that different categories of part for whole 
metonymies discussed by Bierwiaczonek (2013: 201-202) exhibit a degree of flexibility. 
In those examples, the English verb see may metonymically stand for different realisa-
tions of complex SASs of which the stage of visual perception is a particular cognitively 
salient part. 
One common metonymic category that is not discussed by Bierwiaczonek (2013: 
201-202) is the use of see in the sense of accompanying somebody to a location:
43.  My mother used to see me across the road. (LDCE)
44.  Let me see you to the door. (LDCE)
45.  He didn’t offer to see her to her car. (CCALED)
46.  They’ve gone to the airport to see their son off. (LDCE)
47.  Security guards saw him off the premises. (LDCE)
I believe that such examples are instances of the part for whole metonymy relying 
on the Accompanying Scenario, as demonstrated in Table 4:
Table 4. The Accompanying Scenario
The Accompanying Scenario
1. The Before
• There is an individual (Y) who needs to be physically 
accompanied to a location (L).
•  X is an individual capable of physically accompanying 
Y to L.
•  X intends to accompany Y to L.
2. The Core
• X and Y embark on their journey to L.
• X and Y arrive at L.
• X perceives (sees) that Y is at L.
• X understands that Y is at L. 
• X terminates accompanying Y to L.
3. The Effects • Y is at L.
4. The After
• X goes back to his/her previous location.
(…)
The Accompanying Scenario requires two sentient individuals (X) and (Y), and Y needs 
to be accompanied to a location (L). X, who is capable of accompanying Y and willing 
to do so, embarks on the journey and successfully arrives with Y at L. Consequently, 
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X visually perceives Y at L and understands this fact. X then terminates accompanying 
Y to L and may, in some cases, return to their previous location (the After stage).
In the Accompanying Scenario, it is the stage of X visually perceiving Y at location 
L that is used to metonymically access the Accompanying Scenario. It is important 
to note, however, that although sentences (43) to (46) possess clear metonymic qualities 
of physically accompanying a person to a location, sentence (47) is ambiguous because 
seeing off may refer either to physically accompanying an unwanted visitor off the prem-
ises or to repelling an individual from trespassing due to the sheer presence of secu-
rity guards. Such examples would require the study of metonymy–metaphor interplay 
for their explanation. This problem will be briefly addressed in the following section. 
Another part for whole metonymy found in the database is illustrated by the follow-
ing examples:
48.  We saw in Chapter 16 how annual cash budgets are produced. (CCALED)
49.  Elements are usually classified as metals or non-metals (see Chapter 11). (TNODE)
50.  See below/above. (LDCE)
The referential use of see, as presented above, is typical of formal written registers, 
such as instruction manuals or academic papers. The verb of visual perception in this 
context stands for referring to another part of the text in order to retrieve or check 
important information. Note, that in sentences (48) to (50), see does not stand solely 
for the act of visually perceiving the appropriate part of the text; rather, it stands for the 
whole sequence of events required for looking up the relevant information, including 
searching for and retrieving the appropriate portion of the text, reading it, and under-
standing it. Thus, I consider (48) to (50) to be yet another category of part for whole 
metonymy in which the act of visual perception is a salient stage of the script, and it 
is this stage that provides mental access to the whole SAS.
To conclude the discussion of part for whole prepositional metonymy patterns, 
consider the following database examples: 
51.  I can see you’re not happy with the situation. (LDCE)
52.  After a month’s practice, you should see a difference in your playing. (LDCE)
53.  She went outside to see what was happening. (LDCE)
In sentences (51) to (53), see is used in the sense of learning or comprehending 
a certain phenomenon. Note that in such examples, acquiring appropriate knowl-
edge happens as a direct result of visually perceiving the phenomenon. This is hardly 
surprising because, as Sweetser (1990: 33-35) notes, physical vision is a primary source 
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of information. Seeing, thus, appears to be a core component of acquiring knowledge 
in this context. To illustrate that, consider the following Learning Scenario:
Table 5. The Learning Scenario
The Learning Scenario
1. The Before There is a certain proposition, message, sign, or piece 
of information Y, the knowledge of which is important to X 
in a given context.
X is a sentient individual capable of acquiring knowledge of Y.
X intends to acquire knowledge of Y.
X is unimpeded in his/her acquisition of knowledge of Y.
(…)
2. The Core X comes in contact with Y.
X visually perceives (sees) Y.
X acquires the knowledge of Y.
     (…) 
3. The Effects X has acquired the knowledge of Y.
(…)
4. The After X further expands his/her knowledge of Y.  
(…)
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to adequately account for different sets 
of conditions and circumstances applicable to the processes of learning and acquir-
ing information. Thus, the Learning Scenario presented above unavoidably constitutes 
significant idealization and oversimplification of these processes. However, I believe 
the script presented in Table 5 is sufficiently representative of the metonymic shift 
that underlies database examples (51) to (53). In the scenario, a sentient human being 
X comes into visual contact with the object of learning Y. The knowledge of Y is impor-
tant for X in a given context, and X is unimpeded in the attempt to learn Y. As a result 
of coming into contact with Y, X visually perceives Y. Since visual perception is a primary 
channel of learning, X acquires appropriate knowledge of Y as a result of the encounter. 
The Effect of the scenario includes X possessing the knowledge of Y. The After stage 
may be realised, for example, by X expanding the knowledge further for other purposes 
and future goals. 
In the Learning Scenario, the act of visual perception is a central component 
of the script for acquiring information by a sentient human being. Thus, sentences 
(51) to (53) may be characterised as part for whole propositional metonymy. Note, 
however, that this interpretation is possible only in cases where the effect of acquir-
ing appropriate knowledge of Y takes place as a result of X’s direct visual contact with 
Y and where X’s visual perception of Y is necessary for the acquisition of knowledge. 
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However, in the dictionary database, there are numerous instances where seeing is 
related to learning and acquiring information without the direct mediation of visual 
perception. Consider the following examples:
54.  These chocolates are gorgeous. Try some and see for yourself. (LDCE)
55.  I will call him and see how the job interview went. (LDCE)
56.  I saw through his excuses. (LDCE)
Sentences (54) to (56) cannot be convincingly analysed in the light of the Learning 
Scenario because the central stage of the script, the visual perception of the object 
of learning, is not a necessary condition for acquiring appropriate information in this 
context. In fact, other sensory modalities might be more prominently involved. In (54), 
the relevant information is obtained primarily through the sense of taste and in (55) 
through the sense of hearing. On the other hand, sentence (56) refers to the Speaker’s 
processes of thinking and mental deduction, through which a particular conclusion 
about a third party is reached. Therefore, what appears to be the case with the use of see 
in (54) to (56) is a more conceptually distant inter-domain mapping. In order to analyse 
such samples in a convincing way, it is important to consider the role of metaphors 
or, more precisely, the role of metonymy–metaphor interaction in conceptualising 
the link between visual perception and intellectual comprehension. 
4. knowing is seeing: a case of metaphor–metonymy 
interaction 
The metaphoric link between understanding and seeing was explicitly proposed by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980: 48):
57.  I see what you’re saying. 
58.  It looks different from my point of view. 
59.  What is your outlook on that? 
60.  I view it differently.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 354-355) elaborate on that by positing that the knowing 
is seeing metaphor constitutes the basis of the folk theory of how the mind functions. 
They also point to the ubiquitous and cross-linguistic nature of the metaphor and its 
pervasiveness in influencing the intellectual tradition of Western culture:
61. I see what you mean.
62. Could you shed some light on the chaos theory for me?
63. I have a great deal of insight into social relations.
100
......................................................................................... CROSSROADS. A Journal of English Studies 31 (2020) (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) 
64. That’s about as obscure an idea as I’ve ever seen.
65.  We just can’t seem to get clear about gender roles.
66.  Talk about a murky argument.
The dictionary database analysis of the verb see reveals numerous examples in which 
the verb is used in the sense of mental experiencing or intellectual apprehension of a certain 
phenomenon for which no direct mediation of the visual component is necessary. Such 
samples include, apart from the ones presented above in (54) to (56), the following ones:
67.  I saw through your little ruse from the start. (CCALED)
68.  You see, the thing is, I’m really busy right now. (LDCE)
69.  The other officers laughed, but Nichols couldn’t see the joke. (LDCE) 
70.  They are unimpressed with the scheme and rightly see it for what it is. (LDCE)
71.  Now I see that I was wrong. (CCALED)
72.  You and I see things differently. (TNODE)
In order to account for such instances, in this section I intend to focus on the link 
between visual perception and intellectual comprehension in more detail. Although 
I agree that the relationship is metaphoric in nature, I believe that the situation is some-
what more complex than a simple cross-domain mapping and that for a more compre-
hensive understanding of the issue, the role of metonymic mappings and metaphors 
must be considered simultaneously. 
In order to demonstrate that, it is important to mention Grady’s (1999) distinction 
between resemblance metaphors and correlation metaphors. Resemblance metaphors result 
from a perceived similarity between elements of the source domain and target domain, 
as in Achilles is a lion, where the feature of courage is canonically ascribed to the animal 
and mapped onto the human character. Correlation metaphors, on the other hand, arise 
as a result of the correlation of two domains in human experience. knowing is seeing 
is an example of this kind of metaphor. In other words, the metaphoric transfer 
between visual perception and intellectual comprehension is based on the correlation 
of those elements in the human experience of acquiring knowledge. The nature of this 
correlation was, at least partly, presented in Table 5. As demonstrated in the Learning 
Scenario, visual perception, due to its status as a primary source of knowledge, may be 
considered a core element of the script for learning by means of visual perception (part 
for whole propositional metonymy). 
Observations like the one above pose serious questions concerning the relation 
between correlation metaphors and metonymy. This problem has sparked a consider-
able debate in contemporary linguistics (c.f. Barcelona 2000; Grady & Johnson 2002; 
Kövecses 2010, 2013; Kövecses & Radden 1998; Radden 2002; Radden & Kövecses 1999), 
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and it is well beyond the scope of this paper to address it in any detail. Suffice it to 
say here that there appears to be compelling evidence that metonymic processes play 
a role in the emergence of certain metaphoric patterns. Kövecses (2013), for instance, 
claims that most correlation metaphors derive through the metonymic stage via the 
processes of schematization and generalization. Such is the case with understanding and 
seeing, which were originally a part of the same conceptual structure (metonymic rela-
tion) but have been abstracted into the metaphoric pattern linking visual perception 
and intellectual comprehension (Kövecses 2013: pp. 81-83). Therefore, in order to have 
a slightly more comprehensive understanding of the knowing is seeing metaphor, it is 
important to look in more detail at different patterns of metonymy–metaphor interac-
tion in which the emergent metaphor is based on a metonymic mapping.
A study of interaction between metaphor and metonymy for linguistic expressions 
in English was first proposed by Goossens (1990/2002), who coined the term “metaph-
tonymy” as an umbrella term for such processes. When analysing his language data, 
Goossens (1990/2002: 355-357) identifies different instances of metaphor and metonymy, 
as in (73) and (74), below:
73.  She barked at me and hung up.
74.  ‘Oh, dear,’ she giggled, ‘I’d quite forgotten.’
Sentence (73) may be classified as an example of “pure” metaphor, due to the cross-
domain transfer between animal vocalisation and human sound. Sentence (74), 
on the other hand, possesses a metonymic reading in which the speaker may have 
uttered specific words while giggling. In such a case, (74) represents part for whole 
metonymy, wherein giggling is a part of the actual human vocalisation. Another inter-
pretation is also possible for sentence (74), however, namely one in which the speaker 
may have uttered the words as if she were giggling (i.e., in a light-hearted, perhaps slight-
ly silly manner). In such a case, there is a metaphoric transfer between the domains 
of non-verbal vocalisation and human speech. However, the conceptual link with 
the metonymic reading is still present there, because the kind of speech exemplified 
by (74) is characterised precisely by light-heartedness and silliness and may even possess 
some physical qualities of giggling. Goossens (1990/2002) calls such examples “metaphor 
from metonymy”, that is, cases of metaphoric transfer that result from and are moti-
vated by metonymic relations and in which the metonymic reading may still be present 
as a possible interpretation of the utterance.
Goossens’s approach has been reviewed and refined by Ruiz de Mendoza and his 
collaborators (Ruiz de Mendoza 2000; Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez Velasco 2002; Ruiz 
de Mendoza & Otal Campo 2002). They claim that Goossens’s metaphor from metonymy 
category can be characterised more precisely as an instance of a metonymic domain 
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expansion within the source of the metaphoric mapping. By way of illustration, consid-
er Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco’s (2002: 518-520) analysis of to beat one’s breast.
This metaphoric expression is commonly used to designate an act of the open show 
of sorrow about a certain situation. It is based on the physical act of beating one’s breast, 
which metonymically stands for the whole, religiously motivated, scenario of showing 
sorrow. The activity of striking one’s chest area is a cognitively salient part of this script. 
Thus, such a metonymic shift may be considered, in accordance with the discussion 
of the SASs in the preceding section, an instance of the part for whole proposition-
al metonymy, although Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2002) refer in this context 
to the phenomenon of domain expansion. The metonymic target is used, subsequently, 
to metaphorically access the target domain in which the open show of sorrow, which 
may in fact be a disingenuous act carried out in order to achieve one’s particular goals, 
is realised without the physical act of beating one’s breast:
Figure 1. To beat one’s breast (Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez Velasco 2002: 519)
I believe that a similar line of enquiry may plausibly be applied for the analy-
sis of the knowing is seeing metaphor, as exemplified in (54) to (56) and (67) to (72). 
Consider the following diagram, where X is a sentient human being and Y stands for the 
object of learning, that is, any kind of proposition, message, sign, or piece of informa-
tion the knowledge of which is important for X in a given context:
Figure 2. knowing is seeing metaphor
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The diagram shown in Figure 2, despite its unavoidable oversimplifications, 
appears to be reasonably sufficient for the purpose of presenting the basic structure 
of the knowing is seeing metaphoric pattern. The metaphor is based on a sentient 
human being’s (X’s) visual perception of the object of learning (Y), which metonymically 
stands for the whole scenario of acquiring the knowledge of Y as a result of X visually 
perceiving Y. Note at this point that this metonymic shift is congruent with the metonymic 
pattern shown in (51) to (53) and may plausibly be analysed as a part for whole 
propositional metonymic mapping within the Learning Scenario, as demonstrated 
in Table 5, above. The target of the metonymic shift is subsequently used to metaphorically 
access the target domain, which includes X acquiring knowledge of Y without the direct 
mediation of visual perception, as exemplified in (54) to (56) and (67) to (72). 
Finally, an interesting side note to consider is provided by database examples that 
may be ambiguous between metonymic and metaphoric reading. Consider the following:
75.  A lot of people saw what was happening but did nothing about it. (CCALED)
76.  I see from your appraisal report that you have asked for retraining. (TNODE) 
77.  Let me just see what the next song is. (CCALED)
In such cases, depending on the context of the utterance, the relevant knowledge 
may be acquired as a direct result of visual perception or without the mediation of visual 
input. In sentence (75), the future prediction to which the speaker is referring may have 
been based on direct visual observation or may have come as a result of mental deduction. 
Sample (76) describes an appraisal report in which the need for retraining may have been 
explicitly stated or implicitly hinted at and successfully deduced by one’s superior. Similarly, 
in sentence (77), the act of checking what song is forthcoming may involve direct visual 
observation of the display of a player device. Alternatively, checking the appropriate track 
may involve the sense of hearing or, possibly, the speaker’s mental capacities of memory 
and reasoning. In all of the above cases, the reading requiring direct visual perception 
warrants the metonymic interpretation of the utterance of the part for whole 
kind, as exemplified in (51) to (53). In cases where no visual input is directly required, 
metaphoric interpretation is enforced, in accordance with Figure 2 and examples (54) 
to (56) and (67) to (72). This observation sheds extra light on the discussion of metonymy–
metaphor interaction and suggests the possibility of other cases that may plausibly 
be explained as borderline instances residing on a metonymy–metaphor continuum. 
Conclusions
English verbs of sensory perception appear to be significant generators of numer-
ous polysemous senses. The aim of this paper was to propose a cursory analysis 
of certain polysemy patterns of the verb see in the light of propositional metonymy 
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theory. In order to achieve this, a data sample study based on three distinct diction-
ary sources was conducted. The sense of involuntary visual perception was established 
as the basic non-metonymic meaning of the term. The dictionary sources were subse-
quently analysed in order to distinguish different extensions of see that might be moti-
vated by metonymic mappings. 
The analysis suggests that the English verb of visual perception constitutes 
a significant generator of divergent metonymic senses. Such meaning extensions 
may feasibly be discussed in the light of propositional metonymy theory as presented 
by Bierwiaczonek (2013). In accordance with Panther and Thornburg (1999), differ-
ent metonymic extensions are analysed by means of specific context-dependent SASs, 
of which the stage of visual perception is a cognitively salient part. The most signifi-
cant metonymic category appears to be the part for whole propositional mapping. 
It contains the cases in which the stage of visual perception (part of the Core of a SAS) 
stands for the whole relevant scenario. This category includes conceptual patterns 
described by Bierwiaczonek (2013: 201-202), as well as others (e.g., different metonymic 
shifts motivated by the Accompanying Scenario). In order to account for different data-
base samples, the relevant SASs must possess a degree of flexibility, allowing for varia-
tion of their constituent elements. 
Another particularly productive conceptual link in English is the one in which the verb 
see is used in the sense of acquiring appropriate information or knowledge. The concep-
tual link between visual perception and intellectual comprehension has posed some 
theoretical challenges. In contemporary linguistics, the relationship is predominant-
ly considered to be metaphoric in nature (c.f. Kövecses 2013: 81-83; Lakoff & Johnson 
1980: 48, 1999: 354-355; Sweetser 1990: 33-35). However, there appears to be compelling 
evidence that for a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, the role 
of metonymic mappings must be considered alongside metaphor. In accordance with 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez Velasco (2000: 518-519), I consider knowing is seeing a case 
of metonymic expansion within the source of the metaphoric mapping. The metonymic 
relation is congruent with the propositional part for whole metonymic shift within 
the Learning Scenario presented in Table 5, and can plausibly account for cases where 
acquiring appropriate knowledge happens as a direct result of the visual perception 
of the object of learning. The metaphoric mapping, on the other hand, accounts for cases 
where acquiring information happens without the requirement of direct visual input, 
as discussed in Figure 2 and exemplified by samples (54) to (56) and (67) to (72). Certain 
database samples may be ambiguous, and, depending on the context, their interpreta-
tion may gravitate towards either metonymic reading or metaphoric reading.
Although the present paper discusses certain patterns of metonymic extensions of see 
in English and briefly touches upon the problems of metonymy–metaphor interaction 
in relation to the English verb of visual perception, the analysis of these issues is by 
105
......................................................................................... CROSSROADS. A Journal of English Studies 31 (2020) (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) 
no means complete and leaves considerable space for further investigation. Firstly, 
the analysis proposed in this paper is based on a considerably limited pool of diction-
ary data. The data samples include predominantly well-established polysemy patterns 
of the English verb of visual perception as they are presented and recorded in three 
dictionary sources. Although this has allowed for the representation of a number 
of common meaning extensions of see, it does not allow for a comprehensive represen-
tation of the polysemy network pertaining to the verb. A more comprehensive study 
of the English verb of visual perception would require much richer and more informa-
tive data, presumably based on a more detailed analysis of corpora sources. 
Secondly, an elaborate sample database would unavoidably require a more complex 
theoretical background in order for an adequate description of the issues at hand 
to be provided. Although the propositional theory of metonymy and the notion 
of SASs appear to be reasonably adequate tools for the description of the major-
ity of data samples, future research might undoubtedly benefit from the use of more 
detailed and representative SASs underlying their respective language samples. Also, 
because of the limited scope of this paper, the database analysis carried out above 
largely ignores the possibility of part for whole metonymic mappings within SASs. 
Although the relationship between visual perception and intellectual comprehension 
was identified in the present paper as a case of metonymic expansion within the source 
of metaphoric mapping, a more comprehensive study of see would require the investi-
gation of different patterns of interaction between metaphor and metonymy. A more 
comprehensive account of the English verb of visual perception would thus require 
a more detailed focus on the problem of propositional metonymy, correlation meta-
phors, and metaphor–metonymy interaction for the discussion of different polysemy 
patterns of the verb.
Thirdly, see is not the only verb of visual perception in English, and a more repre-
sentative study of the issues at hand would require the consideration of other terms, 
such as observe, notice, perceive, view, and discern. This would have to be connected with 
a more detailed enquiry into numerous idiomatic expressions referring to the human 
visual modality. It may also be interesting to see what kinds of metonymy and meta-
phor are at work there and how they interact in the formulation of such expressions. 
A more comprehensive analysis of a richer pool of language data could possibly allow 
for the formulation of a complex semantic model pertaining to English expressions 
of visual perception. It is hoped, therefore, that the present paper may serve as a small 
step in this direction and that further studies will continue such enquiries in a more 
systematic way for the aim of a more comprehensive account of linguistic representa-
tion of visual perception expressions in English. 
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